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DATA SECURITY 
Abstract: The rising abuse of computers and increasing threat to personal 
privacy through data banks have stimulated rruch interest in the technical 
safeguards for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to 
but distinct from the others. Access controls regulate which users may 
enter the system and subsequently which data sets an active user nay read 
or write. Flow controls regulate the dissemination of values among the 
data sets accessible to a user. Inference controls protect statistical 
data bases by preventing questioners from deducing confidential information 
by posing carefully desired sequences of statistical queries and correlating 
the responses. Statistical data banks are much less secure than most people 
believe. Data encryption attempts to prevent unauthorized disclosure of 
confidential information in transit or in storage. This paper describes 
the general nature of controls of each type, the kinds of problems they can 
arid cannot solve, and their inherent limitations and weaknesses. The paper 
is intended for a general audience with little background in the area. 
Keywords and Phrases: security, data security, protection, access controls, 
information flow, confidentiality, statistical database, statistical 
inference, cryptography, capabilities, public-key encryption, Data Encryp-
tion Standard, security classes. 
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Tin- white-collar criminal, the old adage goes, is a man who has learned 
f.n .r-l:cnl with a pencil. In the last decade or too, a few of the more percep-
tive of these entrepreneurs have discovered that the rewards are greater, and 
the: rir.kn lower, if they steal with a computer. There have already been some 
spectacular thefts but, so far, computer criminals have been handicapped by a 
lack of technical know-how and by a certain inability to think big. Ihe sums 
Involved in typical cases of computer abuse would have been front-page news 
had they been stolen by armed desperados, but have generally been smaller than 
thn haul might have been made by someone with mare expertise and boldness. 
Toe records of hundreds of cases of computer abuse have been analyzed by 
Parker [PAPK76]. Parker believes many more cases probably remain undetected 
or- unreported. Banks in particular are not eager to acknowledge that they have 
been embezzled. The median loss in reported cases was airiest $500,000, the 
maximum loss in a single case was $2 billion, and the total known loss from 
nil computer crime has been about $100 million annually. These figures are 
f|r>si. inr?n to rise unless effective count erne as.ures are taken against the more 
rxpr>H. fit tacks of the second generation of computer criminals, who are now 
Ii',').TTiinf; their trade. 
Aiii.'il. 1)0 nercont of reported abuses were data-entry problems. Most of 
i.he i'fr.1, wothefts or embezzlements by a trusted emoloyee who misused his 
,-icc'v.:; to the comouter. A few were malicious pranks or sabotage. Nearly 
I ! t.hr known cases involve breaches of external security. So far, very 
fW computer crimes have involved breaches of internal security: design 
rihw:: wi thin the computer system itself. But the rapid proliferation of 
<•! iitiiiiil.er;; ant) the increar: inp; sonhisti-
1 
cation of users make businesses and individuals Increasingly vulnerable U> 
abuse by coirputer experts. As the potential rewards increase, so will the; 
sophistication of attacks on computer systems. 
An expert criminal, for exanple, might intercept electronic-fUnds-tram f^r-
messages between two banks; within a few hours be could steal, without a trace, 
several millions of dollars. An investigative reporter might deduce, from ques-
tions answered by a medical information system, that a senatorial candidate 
once took drugs for depression; if published, this information might force the 
candidate to withdraw from the election even though he had been cured. An em-
ployee of a government agency might blackmail citizens using information pur-
loined from a confidential data bank accessible over a federal conputer network. 
These three speculations represent breaches of internal security. Inter-
nal safeguards for data security have been actively studied since the early 
1960's and in anticipation of future security threats, this work has been inten-
sified in the last few years. Systems designers and engineers are developing 
hardware and software safeguards, and theoreticians are studying the inherent 
complexity of security probleriB. Although we have made considerable progress, 
there is still a wide gap between the safeguards that can be Implemented in the 
laboratory — safeguards well within the reach of current technology — and 
those available in most commercial systems. Some of the safeguards that users 
want are theoretically impossible, or would be prohibitively expensive. 
This last point is probably the most important. Absolute security is no 
more possible in conputer systems than it is in bank vaults. The goal if; cnr.t-
effective internal safeguards, sufficiently strong that conputer hardware and 
software are not the weakest links in the security chain. 
In this paper we shall summarize current research in internal security 








b. FLOW. Denied access to file Y, Smith gets confederate Jones to make 
copy; flow controls could prevent this. 
5(f3) 
INFERENCE. A questioner used prior knowledge to deduce confidential 









contents are meaningless to him. 
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1. ACCESS CONTROLS 
Access controls regulate the reading,- changing, 'and deletion of data and 
programs. These controls prevent the accidental or malicious disclosure, modJ-
fication, or destruction of records, of data sets, and of program segnents. 
They prevent malfunctioning programs from overwriting segments of memory be-
longing to other programs. They prevent the copying of proprietary software 
or confidential data. 
Many access control systems incorporate a concept of ownership — that is, 
a user may dispense and revoke privileges for objects he owns. This is coirrnon 
in file systems intended for the long-term storage of one's own data set?; .'ind 
program modules. Not all systems Include this concept; for example, the patient 
does not own his record in a medical information system. Access control sy^ tuiitj 
for owned objects must efficiently enforce privileges that are added, chari^d, 
or revoked. 
The effectiveness of access caitrols rests on three assumptions. The 
first is proper user identification; no one should be able to fool the system 
into giving him the capabilities of another. Authentication schemes based on 
passwords are conmon and simple, but they need safeguards to thwart systematic 
penetration [GAIN78, M0RR78, PAHK76, SALT75, SALT78]. Schemes based on identi-
fying personal characteristics such as voiceprints or dynamic signatures are 
more reliable, but more expensive. The second assumption is that unanticipated 
observers do not gain access by stealing tapes or disk packs or by wiretapping. 
The usual safeguard is encryption, which will be discussed later — information 
that could be monitored by strangers is scrambled. The third assumption ic that 
privilege-information is heavily protected; this is all the information that 
specifies the access each program has to objects in the system. No user':; pro-
gram can write into the segment containing its own privilege specifiers. Pri-
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vi ] rj 7"-jn format ion is accessible only to authorized programs of the supervisor, 
and the privilege to call these programs Is Itself controlled. 
The following subsections consider two important classes of access 
control mechanisms, for transaction-processing systems and for general-purpose 
programming systems. We intend our treatment as a guide to the literature, not 
a detailed study of the many tradeoffs that must be faced in practice. 
Controls for Transaction-Processing.Systems 
The commands issued by the user of a transaction-processing system are 
crI lr. on a small library of "transaction programs" that perform specific opera-
tion:-,, such as querying and updating, on a data base [DENN71] • The user is not 
nllownd to write, compile, and run arbitrary programs. In such systems the 
only programs allowed to run are the certified transaction-programs. There-
fore it Is possible to enforce the rules of access at the interface between 
man and machine. 
A data base management system is an example. A user can identify a 
sot of records by a "characteristic formula" C, which is a logical expression 
u:;inp; the relational operators (=, <, etc.) and the Boolean operators (AND, 
mi, mot); these operators join terms which are indicators of values or conpo-
r. it'loriK of relations. An exanple is 
C = "FEMALE AMD PROFESSOR OR (SALARY > $20K)". 
Tl i« - l.r;in:-action program looks up a forrrula R specifying restrictions that apply 
to u>o Riven user; it then proceeds as if the user had actually presented a 
roMimLa C AMD R. The concept of adding to the requests of a user constraints 
that depend on that user, is cormion in data management systems [BONC77, ST0N7*}] • 
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This form of access control is potentially very powerful. The restriction:; 
R may include data dependent restrictions, which are also a function of the 
current values of the data [00NW72], or history dependent restrictions, which 
are a function of the records previously accessed [HART76]. Implementing thcsi; 
kinds of restrictions can be very difficult. We refer the reader to HSIA78 for 
details. 
When the system allows owners of records to revoke privileges that may tiavc 
been passed around among users, it must be designed to also revoke any privi'Lej^ es 
that emanated from the revoked privilege. Griffiths, Wade, and Fagin have studied 
a revocation method that stamps each privilege-specifier with the time of its 
creation [GRIF76, FAGI78]. 
Controls for General-Purpose Systems 
General purpose systems permit users to write, compile, and run arbitrary 
programs. It is not possible to certify a priori that arbitrary programs will 
forever meet the (changing) access rules of the system, or that there will never 
be program failures or equipment malfunctions. Therefore, these systems provide 
access control mechanisms as part of the runtime environment, often with hardware 
support for performing access checks in parallel with the main computation. These 
mechanisms are typically based on object dependent controls (as opposed to data 
dependent controls), which regulate access to an object Irrespective of the values 
stored in that object. 
Object dependent controls are also needed In transaction processing systems 
to protect against faulty transaction programs, equipment malfunctions, and intru-
ders — problems that cannot be prevented simply by "certifying" the trani.;ad;1 or 1 
programs. 
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Kx.-imn k' "T an Object Dependent Desipyi 
This section illustrates the architecture of object dependent access con-
tolr.. The central concept, capability addressing, has been the subject of 
considerable research. Detailed treatments of this design and its tradeoffs 
can be found in DENN76b, UND?6, 0RGA72, OFGA73, and SALT75• 
Most systems have a large number of segnents (data sets and programs) which 
are kept in the slow-speed bulk store, under the auspices of a file system. When 
an active program requires access to a segment, the operating system provides 
that program with a "capability" for the segment. All a program's capabilities 
are r.tored in a "capability list", which is used by the addressing hardware when 
Interpreting the program's virtual addresses. We will first describe the opera-
tion of the addressing hardware. Then we will describe how a program acquires 
capabilities. 
Figures 2,3, and 4 sunmarize the mechanism for verifying attempted accesses 
to segments stored in the main memory. Figure 2 shows a copy of a 20-word seg-
ment stored in memory at the beginning (base) address 10. A descriptor of the 
r<>rni (D,L) records the base address B and length L of the segnent. Programs 
r'efv»r to words in sepjnents by displacements (line numbers). The corrmand "Read 
D" refers to the Dth line of the segment — that is, memory address BfD. A 
reference is valid only if the displacement is in range — that is, if 
f) D < L. 
Fifrure 3 shows that descriptors of all memory segments may be kept in a 
descriptor table. Each descriptor is identified by a unique key K. Now a 
pr'opram refers to a segnent by specifying the displacement and the key — thus, 




Is stored with a "presence bit" that tells whether the associated segment i:-. 
in the main store; if it is not, as for key 7 in Figure 3, an attempted rofv-ivnw 
will trigger a "missing segment fault" that will cause the operating system tu 
suspend the program and load the segment. This scheme confers considerable flexi-
bility because the operating system can freely move segments between main arxl 
secondary memory merely by updating the descriptors. Because the keys do not 
change, no program is affected by relocations of segments in the memory hierarchy. 
Figure 4 shows the final step in the scheme: the capability listr; are asso-
ciated with programs. The access code of a capability specifies one or more kind:; 
of access: read (R), write (W), execute (E), or call (C). Read access per-mlt:; a 
program to copy a value out of a memory segment; write access permits n pi-orrvmi 
to store a value in a memory segment; execute access permits a processor to fetch 
instructions from a segment; and call access permits a program to execute a pro-
cedure call instruction with that segment as the target. Execute access Is 
valuable for restricting access to privileged operations. A program actually 
refers to a sequent by a segment nuntier S and a displacement D. Thus "Read S, 
D" refers to the Sth segment In the capability list of the program. The reference 
is valid only if the Sth capability specifies R-access and contains key K, with 
D being within the range specified In the Kth descriptor. 
This strategy has special advantages when segnents are shared. Each pro-
gram can be given its own capability, with its own access code, for the comnon 
segment; the comnon segment can be used by different programs whose authors 
require no prior agreement on the local segment numbers. In Figure programs 
M and N share the segment with key 3. 
With this mechanism each program module can have its own capability list. 
In Figure Program N's call access for Program P is stored In the 10th sepment 
of N. If Program N executes the canmand "Call 10", control will pass to Pi019•am 
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Figure Capability lists for accessing segments. 
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that the called program has a capability list different from that of the cn'l 1<t. 
Program P, whose first capability designates the memory segjnent containing the 
descriptor table, would be a certified program of the operating system; i i. wmi M 
screen all requests to update descriptors. When Program P executes a "Return" 
conroand, Program N resumes execution after the call and its capability list, i:: 
again in control. 
The concept of giving each program Its own set of capabilities supports the 
principle of least privilege [DENN76, LTND76, SALT75]• Each capability lint 
need contain entries only for the segnents required for the associated program 
to carry out its task. Damage Is confined In case the program contains an error. 
Untrusted programs can be encapsulated and cannot endanger unrelated prof^ iim-,. 
Critical data, such as the descriptor table of Figure J4, can be hidden away, tam[>ere-
proof, in a domain accessible only to the program certified to manipulate it. 
The foregoing discusses how capabilities are used to limit access. We tum 
now to the question of how programs obtain their capabilities In the first place. 
Figure 5 Illustrates hew a file system attaches privilege-specifier's to 
permanent files. All users are registered in a master directory- Each user lists 
all his files in a personal directory, of which each entry specifies the file's 
name (N), length (L), address In the bulk store (BA), a list of authorized users 
(AL), and the file's unique Identifier (K). Each entry in an authorization list 
specifies the name and type of access permitted of some individual designated 
by the owner. The figure shows that Jones has granted read (R) permission for 
his File Y to Smith and himself, write (W) permission to himself alone, and no 
access to Cox. If a program owned by Smith attempts access to Jones' File Y, 
the operating system will intervene and insert a capability (R,K) at some posi-
tion S In the capability list of Smith's program; thereafter, Smith's program 
can access the file by issuing read coirmands with the segment number S. This 
• M A S T E R : U . . 7 
Figure 5. Access controls for permanent flies* 
is the essence of the scheme used in MULTICS [ORGA72, SALT75, SCHR72]. 
It is also possible to create a program's capability list during compi !,-i-
tion. This is natural in an environment where the program modules corresrxmd 
to managers of extended-type objects, and the capabilities point to the component:; 
of a particular object. This view, proposed by Dennis and Van Horn [DKNV6(5j, is 
used in the Hydra system [COHE75], the CAP system [NEED77], and the Pkj;;:;c-.y Sys-
tem 250 [ENGL7tJ]. (See GEHR79 for a review.) 
Some systems permit owners to revoke privi]e/n3s. Tf all privilej^n,-ci f ici-
are stored in a central table, It is a relatively simple matter to purer; them 
[GRIF76, PAGI78]. But if they are scattered throughout the system in capability 
lists, revocation becomes considerably harder: the descriptor table must contain 
chains of descriptors that can be broken by an owner; this renders revoked capa-
bilities useless but does not purge than [NEED77, HEDE71J, SALT75 ] -
Limitations of Access Controls 
Most security flaws in existing systems are the consequences of desipp short-
cuts taken to increase the efficiency of the operating system. Hardware desi [Tied 
to support access control efficiently would go a long way toward removing these 
flaws. An example is the high overhead in managing small memory sepjnents. Users 
are forced to pack data and subprograms into large segments, which means that 
small program-blocks cannot be individually protected. This makes the ideal of 
a separate capability list for every program very difficult to achieve. Radical 
changes in conputer architecture, designed to bridge the "Semantic gap" between 
concepts in the progranmlng language and concepts in the machine language, may 
be needed to overcome this difficulty. Meyers' SWARD machine [MEYE70] and 
Gehrlnger's "typed memory" [GEHR79] point in the right direction. 
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Another serious problem with existing systems is excessive privilege vested 
in the operating system. A supervisor mode of operation takes over when the 
uF^ r':; program calls any operating system program. Hie supervisor mode overrides 
all or irr>st of the storage-protection mechanisms. The supposedly correct and 
trustworthy supervisor programs can manipulate capabilities and segments without 
restriction [WILK68]. This difficulty Is ameliorated somewhat in MULTICS, which 
has n linear hierarchy of supervisor states, called rings, that confer successively 
greater privilege; the user can operate soms untrusted subprograms in rings of low 
privilege [SCHR72], Contrary to the principle of least privilege, systems based 
on supervisor states permit programs in higher rings to run with much more privi-
lege than they require for their tasks. There Is no efficient way for two cooper-
ating subprograms to have nonoverlapping sets of privileges. 
The supervisor-mode problem Is an instance of exposure to the general problem 
of "Trojan Horses" [LIND76]. It arises when a subprogram written by an outsider 
ibrought Into the domain of a given user. With all the user's privileges and 
possibly more, the subprogram is free to wreak havoc — for example, by erasing 
rile:-, or entering erroneous data. A system capable of running each subprogram 
with its own set of capabilities offers the best practical defense against Trojan 
llnr-ne", because the outsider's program can be confined to a domain having the 
Jr.viiit. privilege required for the agreed task. 
Access mechanisms as outlined here are feasible today at reasonable 
r:tv.-,t. The increasing importance of sharing Information among different users 
<>r .'i (•m;iran data base, of encapsulating programs, and of limiting damage in case 
nP i-rmr or inalfunction, all contribute to a growing pressure on manufacturers 
t.ii build better machines. 
There are additional limitations that are much more difficult to overcome: 
pi-nvinf; that a corrputer system continually meets its access specifications; 
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proving that authorizations are continually consistent with owners' Intention:;; 
and proving that information stored in files and segments remains amoiif; authorized 
users. The possibility of hardware malfunction, which can alter information stored 
in the memory, makes rigorous proofs impossible because it subverts the necessary 
assumption that all possible changes in system state are controllable. Arbitrarily 
low risks of damage can be achieved only at correspondingly high investments; in 
error-checking equipment. 
Proving that a conputer system continually meets its access specifications 
is straightforward in principle: the prover must show that all programs and hard-
ware for enforcing the current authorizations, and for permitting changes in 
authorizations, work as specified. In practice, this is easier to say th;in do 
because the correctness of many complex programs must be established [GAIN78] 
and because automatic "program-proving" is a distant goal. Much effort has been 
devoted to developing formal access control models which can be elaborated into 
the design of a system. At SRI International, the PSOS (Provably Secure Operating 
System) is structured as a linear hierarchy of fourteen nested abstract machines, 
each of which can be proved correct if the machines below are correct [NEUM77]. 
This system is expressed in a special language, called SPECIAL, that incorporates 
specifications explicitly into the programs. Several other research groups have 
adopted a less anbitious approach; rather than try to prove that the entire sys-
tem meets all Its specifications, they centralize all the operations affecting 
security Into a system nucleus called the "security kernel". The correct opera-
tion of the kernel implies that the entire system is secure. (See MILL76, 
POPE78b, POPE78c, and SCHR77.) 
Proving that extant authorizations are continually consistent with nwnor':; 
intentions is Fraught with difficulties. Many systems nennJ t users to i:rm\t 
15 
othorv. subsets of their own privileges. In such systems an owner might well be 
Interested In the safety problem, which seeks answers to questions of the form, 
"Can the programs of Dser X ever gain read access to File Y?'1 Safety problems 
are easily answered in the special case of systems conforming to the "take-grant 
model" [SNYD77, LIFT78J. However, Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman have shown that 
the primitive operations of practical access control systems are sufficiently 
powerful to encode the state of an arbitrary Turing Machine into the extant 
access control privileges; the halting problem is thereby reducible to the 
safety problem, which means that the safety problem Is undecidable. This result 
is nv-iinly of theoretical interest, for it is usually possible to answer specific 
safoty questions. However, this result explains why it is impossible to devise 
a single approach for all safety questions; each one must be analyzed separately. 
Proving that stored information remains among authorized users is also 
difficult because a user who may read a file may also make a copy, perhaps in 
code, which he can then pass along to someone who is denied access to the original. 
However, this is not a geniune defect of access controls, which are intended to 
rerulate access to stored objects but not what happens to the information contained 
iri ther.e objects. Many leaks based on copying can be eliminated by augmenting an 
news:; control mechanism with controls on information flow. This is studied next. 
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2. FLOW CONTROLS 
A flow occurs from object X to object Y when a sequence of instruction:; 
that reads from X writes a value into Y. Copying File X into' File Y is an ex-
ample of a simple flow. Much more subtle flows are possible, as we will note 
shortly. 
Active flow-control research began in the early 1970s. Most flow controls 
employ some concept of security class; the transfer of information from a render 
to a receiver Is allowed only if the receiver's security class Is at least as 
privileged as the sender's [EENN76a]. A flow policy specifies the channeln 
along which information is allowed to move. Flow controls can prevent a service 
program from leaking a customer's confidential data. They can block the trans-
mission of secret military data to an unclassified user. 
The most general flow controls monitor the detailed data flows in pi^ gruritt. 
However, such controls are often complex and hard to use efficiently. Controls 
based on security classes are usually efficient, though often exasperatingly 
conservative. 
Flow Policies 
The simplest flow policy specifies just two classes of information: confi-
dential (C) and nonconfidential (N), and allows all flows except those from class 
C to class N. This policy can solve the confinement problem that arises when a 
service program handles customer data, some of which is confidential [FENT7^ , 
LAMP73, LIPN75]- The service program may retain some or all of the customer's 
nonconfidential data, but it must be prevented from retaining, or releasing to 
its owner, any of the confidential data. An income-tax-computing service, for 
example, might be allowed to retain a customer's address and the bill for services 
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rendered, but riot the customer's Income or deductions. 
Government and military conputer systems have a more complex flew policy 
('fir i;]; w. in ed data. Rach security class is represented by two parts (i, x), 
where i denotes an authority level and x a category, There are usually three 
authority levels: 1) confidential, 2) secret, and 3) top secret. There are 2™ 
categories, comprising all possible contoinations of m conpartments; typical 
compartments are U (unrestricted), R (restricted), S ( sensitive), and C (crypto). 
Information is permitted to flow from an object with security class (1, x) to 
one with class (j, y) only if i < j and only if the conpartments of x are also 
compartments of y. Transmissions from (2, RS) to (3, RS) or to (2, RSC) are 
allowed, for example, but those from (2, RS) to (1, RS) or to (3, R) are not. 
Mechanisms 
.Simple flow controls can be enforced by an extended access control mechanism, 
which involves assigning a security class (usually called the clearance) to each 
rum n i v; program. The program is allowed to read a particular memory segment only 
i f j.t:> security class is as high as that of the segment. It is allowed to write 
in a r.fff)nent only if its class is as low as that of the segment. This automati-
cally ensures that no information transmitted by the program can move from a 
hh-h'M' to a lower class. A military program with a secret clearance, for example, 
can t-oad only from objects which are unclassified, confidential, or secret; It can 
write only Into objects which are secret or top secret. It is forbidden to write 
into unclassified or confidential objects, or to read from top secret objects. 
:'}/::I.ems designed at SDC [WEIS69], MURE [MTLL76], Case-Western-Reserve University 
IW/U/T^ l, and SRI International [MEUM77] are of this type. 
The extended access control mechanism has a tendency to overclassify data. 
Information flows upward but never downward. This problem can be mitigated by 
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letting the security class of a program rise while running, so that. it. k; f>n!.v 
as high as the highest security information that the program has read. Tn thi:; 
case the security class of the program is a "higi-water mark" rather than a 
clearance. This reduces but does not eliminate overclassification because the 
high-water mark cannot be lowered. 
An important limitation of the extended access control mechanism is Its 
lack of generality. For example, if the income-tax program mentioned ear 1ior-
is confidential, it will be forbidden to process confidential customer data; 
if it is confidential, it will be forbidden to write nonconfidential information 
into any of its files. A usable operating system could not be secured by this 
mehcanism — all its outputs would have to be classified at least as high as every 
class of information stored within. This limitation results from the implicit 
assumption that any input of a program can flow to any output, which forcer, the 
designer to assume that the confidentiality of each output is as high or- hitfier 
than the confidentiality of every input. 
To be free of this limitation, flow controls must be able to examine the 
way information flows through the statements and variables of a program — 
determining precisely how inputs flow to each output. This is not straight-
forward. Suppose that x is 0 or 1 when this statement is executed: 
if x = 0 then y := 0 else y := 1. 
This statement copies x to y implicitly by encoding the value of x into the 
control flow. (Note that this program still transmits some information from x 
to y even if the initial value of x is unknown.) Implicit flows of thi:;; type 
can be easily detected by associating with the program counter a dynamic security 
class corresponding to the Boolean expressions which influence it. 
Here is a program fragment specifying a flow that is more difficult to detect 
19 
while x ^  0 do skip; print ('done'); stop . 
Thin program will print 'done' only if x - 0; otherwise it will enter an "in-
rinlU?" loop, which actually means it will eventually be terminated abnormally. 
Tn this case, the output produced by the program reveals the position of the 
program counter when the program stops, thereby revealing the information encoded 
therein, A partial solution results if one can prove that the loops of one's 
program ail terminate [REIT78]. However, all types of abnormal program termi-
nation present problems for flow detectors [DENN76a, DENN77]. 
Several techniques are available for detecting and verifying internal flows 
of programs. The most comrron eirploy traditional methods of program verification. 
The allowable input/output dependencies of program modules are stated as formal 
assertions, which are then proved by tracing data flows within the program. This 
approach was used for the systene at MITRE [MELL76], UCLA [P.OFE78c], and SRI 
[NEUM77]. A simpler approach results when security classes can be declared for 
the variables in the program; using a technique similar to type-checking, the 
coup "tier can verify that each program statement specifies flows that are con-
i:>Lcnt with the given flow policy [DENN77]. Although highly efficient, this 
ircthod ialso highly conservative: it will reject programs that would be 
t-ert.i fled under a traditional flow analysis. Cohen's information-theoretic 
relieves this difficulty by certifying all flows that will occur during 
execution of the program [COHE77, COHE78]. Furtek and Millei have proposed 
u theory of information flow using analogs of prime irnplicants of switching 
theory [FURT78, MILL781; it too can lead to more precise certification. Reitman 
:md Andrews have incorporated the flow semantics of DEMN77 into the formalism of 
program verification for more precise certification [REIT78]. 
The foregoing methods are based on static analysis; they certify a program 
prior to execution and require no run-time support. However we do not know how 
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to certify programs that use variables whose security classes can chance during 
execution, or whose inputs can have different security classes on different in-
vocations. These cases require a combination of static analysis and run-Uiiu-> 
checking. A preliminary study of such a system was made by Fenton, whose "data 
mark machine" tagged every memory cell (and the program counter) with a security 
class; the processor would Inhibit any instruction whose execution would violate 
the flow policy [JENT71!]. 
Limitations of Flow Controls 
We suggested earlier that all mechanisms based on security classe:; tend to 
overelassify information, since only upward flow is allowed. This problem can 
be mitigated by permitting "downgrading" — the manual lowering of security 
classes by an authorized person. It is also possible to permit downward flows 
through certain information-losing programs. Such programs are supposed to 
filter cut enough information about their Inputs that their results are of lower 
confidentiality. Not much is known about such programs except that, as we shall 
observe in the discussion of inference control,, many programs believed to filter 
out information actually do not. 
One type of flow cannot be controlled easily, if at all. A program can 
convey information to an observer by encoding it into some physical phonomenon 
without storing It into the memory of the conputer. These are called flows on 
covert channels [LAMP73, LIPN75]. A simple covert channel is the running time 
of a program. A program might read a confidential value, then enter a loop that 
repeatedly subtracts 1 from the value until it reaches zero, whereupon it stops. 
The owner of the program can determine the confidential value simply by observing 
the running time. More conplex channels exploit other resource-usage patterns 
such as the electric power consumed while running a program. 
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The only known technical solution to the problem of covert channels requires 
that the owner of a job state in advance what resources his job will use and how 
much time it will take. The requested resources are dedicated to the Job, and 
the results, even if incomplete, are returned to the user at precisely the tlms 
specified. This strategy allows the user to deduce nothing from running time or 
resource usage that he did know beforehand; but even then, he can deduce something 
from whether or not his program was successfully completed. This scheme can be 
prohibitively expensive. Cost effective methods of closing all covert channels 
completely probably do not exist. 
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3. INFERENCE CONTROLS 
When Information derived from confidential data mist be declassified for 
wider distribution, the rules of flow control most be suspended. This is true 
of statistical data bases (data banks) which contain sensitive in format ion iibout 
individuals and must provide various kinds of statistical sunmaries about the 
population. The Bureau of the Census, for example, is charged by law to co'Hoct 
information on all citizens and to report sunmaries of this information without 
revealing any particulars. Similarly, medical information systems are supposed 
to produce health statistics but not to release health data about any one patient. 
The problem is that sunmaries contain vestiges of the original information; 
a snooper might be able to reconstruct this information by processing enough 
summaries. This is called deduction of confidential information by Inference. 
When the information pertains to an individual, the deduction compromises his 
privacy. The objective of inference controls to make the cost of obtaining 
confidential Information unacceptably high-
When invoking a query program, a questioner supplies a characteristic formula 
C, which is a logical formula whose terms are joined by the Boolean operators (AND, 
OR, NOT). The set of records whose contents satisfy formula C is called the query 
set for C. The query program's response is computed from the query set; it may be 
the count of the records, the sum of values in the records, or the selection of a 
value, such as a maxinum or median. 
A record is compromised if a questioner can deduce its confidential values 
by correlating responses to his queries, using any prior information he might 
have. Most conpromises are based on isolating a desired record at the Inter-
section of a set of interlocking queries. Defenses include controls that 
withhold response for improper query set sizes and overlaps, controls that 
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distort the responses by rounding or by falsifying data, and controls that apply 
queries to random samples of the data base. Examples are Riven in the next sub-
sections. 
Controls on Query Set Sizes and Overlaps 
When the questioner has complete control over the query set, and when re-
sponses are undistorted, compromise is easy. This Is Illustrated by a dialogue 
between a questioner and a medical data base: 





Harvard Law Degree 
Bank Vice President 
A: 1. 
Suppose the questioner knows that Fenwick has these characteristics; he now 
attempts to discover something confidential about Fenwick from this query. 





Harvard Law degree 
Bank Vice President 
Took drugs for depression 
Tn1s query will respond with "1" if Fenwick has taken drugp for depression and 
"0" otherwise. 
The principle of this compromise is simple. The questioner finds a formula 
(• whoso query set count is 1. He can then discover whether the individual thus 
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isolated has any other characteristic X by asking, "Hew many individuals satisfy 
C AND X?" (Ihe response "1" indicates that X is characteristic of the individual 
and "0" indicates not.) This attack was first reported by Hoffman and Miller 
[HOFF70]. 
It might seem that this compromise could by prevented by a minimum query 
set control: 
Do not respond to queries for which there are fewer than 
k, or wore than n-k, records in the query set, where n is 
the total number of records in the data base. 
The por»1 tive integer k in this control is a design parameter specifying the 
smallest allowable size of a query set. If the query-language permits coirple-
mentation, a maximum size n-k of the query set must also be enforced, for other-
wise the questioner could pose his queries relative to the complement (NOT C) 
of the desired characteristics (C). 
Unfortunately, this control Is ineffective. Schlorer showed that conpro-
niiufN": may be possible even for k near n/2 by the technique of a "tracker" 
[PCHL75, SCHL79]. The basic Idea is to pad small query sets with enough extra 
rreordr. to make them answerable, then subtract out the effect of the extra re-
cords. Schlorer called the formula Identifying the extra records the tracker 
because the questioner can use it to "track down" additional characteristics of 
an individual. 
Suppose that a questioner, who knows from external sources that an individ-
ual T is characterized by the logical formula C, is able to express C in the 
form 0 = (A AND B) such that queries for the formulae A and (A AND NOT B) are 
both answerable. Schlorer called the formula T = (A AND NOT. B) the tracker of I. 
Table l shows a data base recording n = 8 secret political contributions. Suppose 
that k = ?; then responses are given only to queries applying to at least 2 but 
24<t) 
Name Sex Occupation 
Abel M Journalist 
Baker M Journalist 
Charles M Entrepreneur 
Darwin F Journalist 
Engel F Scientist 
Fenwlck M Scientist 
Gary F Doctor 










TABLE I> Political contribution database. 
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not more than 6 individuals. Suppose further that the questioner believes thai: 
C = (JOURNALIST AND FEMALE) uniquely Identifies Darwin. The minimum query 
control would prevent direct questioning about Darwin. The dialogue below show;-, 
how Darwin1s contribution can be deduced by using as tracker the formula 
T = (JOURNALIST AND NOT FEMALE) = (JOUFNALIST AND MALE). 
Q: How many persons are JOURNALIST? 
A: 3 
Q: How many persons are JOURNALIST AND MALE? 
A: 2 
By subtracting the second response from the first, the questioner verifier, that 
(JOURNALIST AND FEMALE) identifies only one individual (Darwin). The questioner 
continues with 
Qr What was the total of contributions by all persons 
who are JOURNALIST? 
A: $8500. 
Q: What was the total of contributions by all persons 
who are JOURNALIST AND MAIE? 
A: $3500. 
Since Darwin is the only female Journalist, her contribution is the difference 
between the response of the second query and the response of the first ($5000). 
It might seem that the effort to compromise the entire data base is very 
high because the questioner would have to know Identifying characteristics of 
each individual In order to construct a tracker for that individual. However, 
if a questioner can find any formula whose query set contains at least 2k but 
not more than n-2k records, he can use that formula as a "general tracker" to 
determine the answer to any (unanswerable) query of the data base [DBNN79a]. 
Schlorer has shown that often more than 99? of the possible formulae will be 
general trackers, and that the effort to retrieve data using trackers is usually 
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quite low [SCHL79]• It is possible to find a tracker with at most log^ S queries, 
where S is the number of possible distinct configurations of characteristics 
fni-wj/qi-i. 
Tracker-based compromises enploy groups of records having high overlaps. 
'Ihe compromise illustrated above works precisely because Darwin is the only 
JOURNALIST excluded from the group (JOURNALIST AND MALE). To protect against 
trackers, one might consider a minimum overlap control: 
Do not respond to a query that has more than a predetermined 
number of records in coirmon with every prior query. 
Such .1 control is obviously infeaslble: before responding, the query program 
would have to corrpare the latest query group against every previous one. But 
even if feasible, this control can be subverted in data bases where each confi-
dential value appears just once [EOBK79]. This dialogue Illustrates such com-
promise using queries that overlap by one record: 
Q: What was the largest of the contributions by persons 
who are JOURNALIST? 
A: $5000-
Q: What was the largest of the contributions by persons 
who are FEMALE? 
A: $5000. 
['•ec.au:> each contribution is unique, there can be only one person who is JOUR-
NALIST, FEMALE, and contributed $5000 (Darwin). Indeed, the same compromise 
work:-, even if the query program occasionally returns the contribution of the 
WTvmp; person [DEMI77]; 
Q: What was the smallest of the contributions by persons 
who are JOURNALIST? 
A: (lying): $5000. 
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Q: What was the largest of the contributions by persons 
who are FEMALE? 
A: (truthfully) $5000. 
A minimum overlap control may also be subverted by solving a linear system of 
equations for an unknown data value [DOBK79, SCHW79]-
These examples illustrate compromises that use the contoinatorial principle 
of inclusion and exclusion to Isolate a record. A design that can prevent this 
is a partitioned data base [YU78]: 
Store the records in groups, each containing at least 
some predetermined number of recrods. Queries may 
apply to any set of groups, but never to subsets of 
records within any group. 
With this control, attacks based on inclusion and exclusion can, at best, isolate 
one of the groups — but queries for single groups are allowed. "Micro-aggrega-
tion" is a form of partitioning: groups of individuals are aggregated into syn-
thetic "average individuals" and statistics are computed for the synthetic In 
individuals rather than the real ones [FEXG70]. The partitioned data base has 
two practical limitations that can be quite severe. First, the legitimate fY-ee 
flow of statistical summaries can be inhibited by excessively large groups or by 
ill-considered groupings- Second, forming and re-forming groups as records are 
Inserted, updated, and deleted frcm the data base leads to excessive bookkeeping. 
Rounding and Error Inoculation 
The second class of inference controls is based on distorting the responses. 
These are usually called rounding controls because the exact answer to a query 
is perturbed by a small amount before it is reported to the questioner. 
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Rounding by adding a zero-mean random value is Insecure since the correct 
answer can be deduced by averaging a sufficient nurttoer of responses to the 
same query. Rounding by adding a pseudo-random value that depends on the data 
is preferable since a given query always returns the same response. Although 
reasonably effective, this method can sometimes be subverted with trackers 
[SCHL77], by adding durrmy records to the data base [KAHP70], or simply by com-
paring the responses to several queries [ACHU78]. 
A perturbation can also be achieved with error inoculation: the value in 
a record is randomly perturbed or replaced by another value before it is used 
to compute a statistic [ffiCK79, BORU72, CAMF77]• Data could be nidified before 
being stored in a record, In which case the orlglanl data Is discarded. This 
can have serious adverse consequencies if the correct data is supposed to be 
available for authorized users of the data base. Alternatively a "perturbation 
factor" can be stored permanently in the record along with the original data; 
it is applied when the data is used in a query. 
Like rounding, error inoculation reduces the quality of the statistics 
released. To prevent compromise, large errors may have to be introduced into 
the data. 
A variation of this approach, which may yield more accurate statistics, Is 
data swapping: the values of fields of records are exchanged so that all i-order 
:;tat1atics (which involve i attributes) are preserved for i <_ d and some d 
|t)AU;yft, SCHL78]. Even if a questioner succeeds in isolating a value, he has no 
way or knowing with which individual it is actually associated. The problem with 
the approach is the difficulty of finding sets of records whose values can be 
swapped. It remains to be seen whether this control can be cost effective. 
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Random Samples 
The third group of controls is based on applying queries not to the entire-
data base but to a "random sample" — a subset of records chosen at random. 
This group Is potentially the most effective beacuse it deprives the questioner 
of control over the contents of query sets. The i960 U.S. Census, for example, 
was distributed on tape as a random sanple of one record in one thousand; each 
sample record contained no name and It specified location only by size of city 
in one of nine geographic regions [HANS71]. The cleverest snooper would have 
at best 1/1000 chance of associating a given sample record with the right indi-
vidual. These odds are too poor for compromise of the sample to be worthwhile. 
Coimiercial data management systems now permit the construction of small -
to medium-scale data bases which change constantly through insertion, deletion, 
and modification of records. A small random sanple would be useless hocause it 
would not be statistically significant and because it would not represent the 
current state of the data base. For these reasons random samples have been 
ignored as an inference control in such data bases. 
However, when contained with a minimum query set control, random sanple 
queries can be an effective defense [DEWN79c]. The scheme works as follows. 
As it locates each record satisfying a given formula C, the query program 
determines whether or not to keep that record for the "sampled query set". 
This determination should idealy be pseudo-random so that the same sampled 
query set Is conputed any time the given formula C is presented. Each queried 
record Is selected idependently for the sampled query set with a given, fixed 
probabllitypp. Statistics then are computed from the sanpled query set. A 
minimum query set control Inhibits the response if the true query set's size Is 
too small or too large. 
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With a simulated data base and p = .9375, this method estimated counts (and 
sums) of answerable query sets to within 15? of their true values [DENN"79c]. How-
ever, the estimates of counts (and sums) estimated with trackers contained errors 
of several hundred percent; this is because the questioner must estimate small 
counts (or sums) by subtracting large counts (and sums). (An Illustration: the 
questioner tries to find the count for C by subtracting the response 100 from 
the response 101, both of which have error ± 1; the difference, 1, has error ±2.) 
Limitations of Inference Controls 
Because queries inevitably carry some information out of the data base, 
one cannot reasonably hope to design a system that is impossible to conpromise. 
The objective of research on Inference controls is to discover how much conpu-
tational work, measured by conputer time or by dollars spent, would be required 
to compromise a particular system. This would enable designers either to raise 
the cost of compromise beyond a specific threshold, or to declare that the de-
r . i r r d level of security could not be implemented with the given cost constraints. 
'the query functions of many comnercial data base systems seem to release 
much more Information about confidential records than many people have suspected. 
Without proper controls, data bases subject to simple compromises will be the 
rule rather than the exception. When confcined with minimum query set restrictions, 
random sanple queries appear to offer the best defense. 
A final defense against snooping is threat monitoring — inspection of logs 
or audit trails for unusual patterns of queries, especially many queries for the 
same records [H0FF70]. Although it does not attempt to control the flow of infor-
mation through query programs, monitoring threatens exposure of illegal activity-
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4. CRYPTOGRAPHIC OONTROLS 
Access, flow, and inference controls may not prevent accidental or malicious 
disclosures of sensitive data. None of these controls helps if an operator1 leave 
a listing of the password file on a desk, if confidential data is moved off-line 
during backup or maintenance, if transmissions are tapped or played back, or if 
hardward and software are faulty. Encryption is a coraiDn safeguard for data 
stored in, or in transit through, media whose security cannot be guaranteed by 
these other controls. With the help of a secret key (K) the sensitive plain-
text (M) is scrambled into unintelligible ciphertext (I?) before being put in 
the insecure medium. 
In a traditional cryptosystem, illustrated in Figure 6, there la a slow-
speed secure channel by which the sender can inform the receiver of the key K 
used to encode the message. The message itself, transmitted at high speed 
through the insecure medium, Is secure as long as the key Is secret. Simnoris 
calls this synmetrlc encryption because the same key is used at both ends of the 
channel [SUWI79] • The code is broken if an intruder can deduce the key by ana-
lyzing the ciphertexts. Keys are changed regularly, usually more often than the 
time in which the cleverest intruder is believed capable of locating the key 
systematically. 
The code will be unbreakable if the key is a sequence of random bits as 
long as the message (pseudo-random generation will not dol); each key bit speci-
fies whether the corresponding message bit is complemented or not. With such a 
key, called a one-time pad, each bit of ciphertext Is purely random and uncorre-
cted with all other bits of ciphertext. Practical cryptosysterns are based on 
keys that are much shorter than the messages; because the intruder may know the 
enciphering and deciphering algorithms, the security of these cryptosystem: 
depends on the secrecy of the keys and the conputational difficulty of inverting 
3 1 ( f ) 
Insecure Channel 
Figure 6. Encryption using one key (traditional view)• 
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the enciphering algorithms. Overviews of cryptosystems are given by Di fTi e 
and Hellman [DIFF76], Gardner [GARD77], Hoffman [HOFF77], Konheim [KONH78], 
Lempel [L04P79], and Simmons [SIMM79]• Fascinating accounts of codes and their 
breakings have been written by Kahn [KAHN67] • 
It is reasonable to suppose that military and diplomatic experts have secure 
channels for exchanging encryption keys — for.example secret couriers. There-
fore the security of the traditional cryptosystem is properly measured as the 
work required for an intruder to invert the code through cryptanalysis. 
With conputer networks, It is no longer reasonable to suppose that Individ-
ual senders and receivers have secure means of exchanging secret keys. Needham 
and Schroeder [NEED78] and Popek [POFE78a] have outlined methods, called "proto-
cols", for simulating a secure key-exchange channel. Figure 7 gives the central 
idea of the protocol suggested by Needham and Schroeder. A sending conputer A 
and a receiving computer B seek a secret key K from a secure key-generatlrig 
facility (KG). The conputer KG contains a list of special secret keys, one 
assigned to each conputer of the network; thus A and KG can exchange secret 
messages encrypted with key S. known only to the two. Having decided to send 
SA a message to B, A first transmits the message (A, (I, B) ) to KG, wherein I 
is a message-identifier chosen arbitrarily by A. Since A's name is a plaintext 
prefix of this iressage, KG can locate A's secret key, SA, and decipher the com-
SA ponent (I, B) . Then KG generates a key K and responds to A with the message 
Sr So (I, K, (K, A) ) . Only A can decode this message and obtain the newly gen-
So 
erated key K and the enbedded ciphertext T = (K, A) ; A can also check that 
this message is a unique response from KG by verifying that I is one of his own 
(recent) message-Identifiers. Then A forwards the ciphertext T to B, who is 
the only one capable of decoding It. After these exchanges, both A and B have 
the key K and can begin transmitting directly to each other in code. 




/> s A 
B Sb 
A to KG: 
KG to A: 
A to B: 
( A , ( t , B) ) 
( I , K, ( K , A )Sb )S* 
( K , A) 
>B 
ure 7. Protocol for allocating A and B a common key K for exchanging 
messages. 
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Ihe security of this system clearly depends on the security of the key-gen-
erating facility. Both A and B must trust KG to generate a unique key K, to keep 
all keys secret, and to not monitor any of their private transmissions. 
This example illustrates why key management is essential to secure crypto-
graphic control in conputer networks. The security of these cryptosystenK i.s 
often less dependent on the indecipherability of the code than it is on the 
ability to secure the keys. Saltzer has argued that our demonstrated inability 
to protect passwords in file systems suggests that many cryptosysterts will be 
easily broken not by cryptanalysis but by elementary attacks on the key manager. 
(See SALT78 and also DENN78b, EHRS78, GAIN78, MATY78, MORR78, and POPE78a.) 
Ihe Data Encryption Standard (PES) 
In 1977 the National Bureau of Standards announced a standard encryption 
algorithm (DES) to be used In unclassified U.S. Government comnunications [NBS77]. 
The algorithm was developed by IBM, which offers products that use DES [EHRS78, 
I£NN78, MATY78]. Each 64-bit block of plaintext undergoes a conplex transforma-
tion comprising 16 levels of substitutions and permutations, all controlled hy a 
56-bit key. The algorithm can be implemented cheaply as an 151 chip which would 
allow it to operate at a high data rate. 
The EES can be used as in Figure 6, providing "end-to-end encryption" on 
the channel between the sender A and receiver B. A user can also use DES to 
encipher files for storage in removable or insecure media. However, the data 
must usually be deciphered for processing; other mechanisms, such as access and 
flow controls, are needed to protect the data while it is plaintext. Rive:;t has 
studied cryptosystems which allow a limited nurrber of operations which can be 
performed directly on the clphertext; however, these systems must exclude conpare 
operations if they are to be hi^ily secure [RIVE78b], 
The DES can also be used as a one-way cipher to secure files containing 
passwords [EVAN7^ , MORR78, WILK68]. Each password X is used as the key to en-
cipher a predetermined block of plaintext; the resulting ciphertext C^ is placed 
in the password file along with the name of the password's owner. When a user, N, 
presents a password X, the password is accepted only if C* is already In the 
password file with name N. Because no password is actually stored as plaintext 
in the system, passwords are protected even if the file is disclosed. 
The DBS is not universally regarded as a highly secure cryptosystem. Diffie 
and Hellman argue that it is possible for about $20 million to build a highly 
parallel computer that will locate a key by exhaustive search in about 12 hours 
[DIFF77] • At the 1978 National Computer Conference, Hellman showed how to use 
about million of conventional equipment with a heuristic search to find a key 
within hours. Diffie and Hellman maintain that a 128-bit key (not the 56 bits 
in the standard) would make the EES virtually unbreakable. IBM maintains that two 
DES chips in series can, with double encryption, simulate a single EES chip with 
a ll?-bit key [H0FF77]. IBM also maintains that, even with 56-bit keys, DES Is 
not likely to be the weak link In the security chain. 
1 '1 ihlie-Key Encryption 
In 1976 Diffie and Hellman proposed a new kind of cryptosystem, which they 
called public-key encryption [DIFF76]. Each user has a matched pair of keys, the 
"public key" P and the "secret key" S. Each user publishes his public key to 
everyone through a directory but reveals his secret key to no one. As with the 
HTCT., the encryption algorithm need not be secret. 
Enciphering a message M with the public key P gives a ciphertext M*3 which 
can be sent to the owner of the public key. The recipient deciphers the cipher-
text lining his secret key S to retrieve the message: = M. Since P and S 
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are a matched pair, no one but the owner of the public key can decipher Fi1. The 
operations of P and S are conmitative, that is, (MP)S= (M3)*3 = M. It is in feasi-
ble to conpute one key given the other. Figure 8 Illustrates coruiunlcation 
between two conputers by this scheme. Slnrnons calls this asyiimetrlc encryption 
because different keys are used at the ends of the channel [SITWg ]. Examples 
of specific algorithms are in DIFF76, HELL78, KONH78, IEMP79, I®RK78, and HTVP:78a. 
Public-key cryptosystems also present an easy solution to "digital signatures", 
the problem of proving that a particular message was in fact transmitted by the 
person claiming to have transmitted It. To create a signature, one enciphers a 
predetermined message M with his secret key S, offering M2 as the signature. 
Anyone challenging the signature need only apply the public key P of the purported 
signer, for only then will = M. (See DIFF76, RIVE78a, KONH78, and LEMP79 •) 
Digital signatures can also be Inplemented with single-key cryptosystenr,, but the 
solution is much less elegant [NEED78, RABI77]. 
A result by Shamir, FtLvest, and Adleman suggests that a modification of 
public-key encryption could also be an approximate one-time pad [SHAM79]. Users 
A and B each select a matched pair of keys but keep both secret. Then A sends 
SA Sr Sa the enciphered message M to B, who then enciphers it and returns (M ) 
SA.SB SR Sr Sa Pfl (M ) to A. Then A applies his second key, P , to obtain M = (CM ) ) , 
which he returns to B. Finally, B obtains the message M by applying his Pg, 
Sr pR 
since M = (M ) . Ihis is not a true one-time pad because three messages are 
actually sent using the four keys. 
Its proponents argue that public-key encryption is more secure than DES 
because no user need rely on the security of the conputer network to safeguard 
his secret key. Indeed, a user's local, personal conputer can interface with the 
network through the encryption device as in Figure 8 and his secret key can be 
engraved electronically Into a memory chip that can be plugged into the encryp-
tion device; he could then guard his encryption key to the same extent as any 
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Figure 8. Public-key encryption. 
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other key in his possession [DENN78b]. 
It is true that the public keys can be distributed by a public directory 
without endangering the secret keys. However, a user still needs assurances that 
the key received from the (purported) public directory Is in fact the public key 
of the requested individual. Confidence in correct distribution of public keys 
can be increased if the public directory signs its responses [KONF78, NEED78]. 
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5- SUMMARY 
The four kinds of internal security controls — access, flow, inference, 
and cryptographic — couplement each other. No one of them can solve the pro-
blems handled by the other three. 
Access controls operate at the external interface, verifying that an indi-
vidual attempting to use the system is authentic, and internally, verifying that 
each running program generates references only to authorized segments of memory. 
Tim ideal access control operates each program in a domain having the minimum 
privilege required for the immediate task. The principle of minimum privilege 
contributes greatly to security by protecting against "Trojan Horses", and to 
reliability by minimizing the extent of possible damage by a malfunctiong pro-
gram. 
Flow controls regulate the dissemination or copying of information by 
prohibiting derived data from having lower confidentiality than the original. The 
higher the data's confidentiality, the stricter the rules on its dissemination. 
When applied to program input-to-output flow, these controls offer a partial 
:-.o]ut.ion to the "confinement problem". 
In Terence controls prevent "leakage" through programs that produce summaries 
of groups of confidential records. They reduce the risk that, by correlating the 
ror.pnnsos from many sunmaries, a user can deduce the confidential values denied 
him by access and flow controls. 
Cryptographic controls protect information stored, or transmitted, in inse-
cure media. The data encryption standard (DES) is efficient and economical, 
though it has been criticized as being breakable and overly dependent on secure 
key management. Public-key encryption does not rely on any central manager for 
-nf'eguarding secret keys, though it requires secure distribution of public keys. 
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All these controls are subject to practical (and sometimes theoretical) 
limitations which keep them from achieving their objectives under all condi tions. 
No mechanism is perfectly secure. A good mechanism reduces the risk of compromise 
to an acceptable level. 
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